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Rectified Sites of Violence from Westgate to Lampedusa:  




The paper investigates whether and how public amnesia of violent incidents such as 
mass drownings or mass killings impacts ongoing conflict dynamics. Specifically, the 
paper compares and contrasts two forms of public amnesia in the relatively little-
studied space of the rectified site- a site of violence returned to prior use without 
‘monumentation’ or commemoration. Looking at the unmarked sites of violence in East 
Africa’s confrontation with Al-Shabaab such as the Westgate Mall and the Mediterranean 
crossings within the  system of migration deterrence, the paper asks: How do 
rectification practices and associated public production of silence feed into conflict 
dynamics and conflict transformation? The paper shows that while public amnesia tends 
to entrench the confrontation, recognition through commemoration needs to be 
calibrated carefully in order to avoid further conflict escalation. Epistemic redress must 
precede physical and symbolic memory work in rectified sites of violence.  
 
KEYWORDS: memory-conflict nexus; politics of amnesia; memory at the interstice; 




Places of memory, memorials and sites of violence are typically viewed through their 
extraordinary status, as signposts to a powerfully unsettling past. They are read for the 
meanings that they imbue and communicate, the symbols they become, however fraught 
or imprecise. This study takes different sorts of places as its subject, the unmarked or 
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uncontained spaces of memory known as ‘rectified sites,’1 places that are not stylized 
and that by choice or due to inevitability, slip back to public, mundane use after violence, 
and yet remain emblematic as spaces of symbolic and political charge.  
The paper aims to investigate the vector and nature of this charge: Does public 
amnesia— as in active state silence on acts of violence symbolized by rectified sites— 
impact on conflict dynamics, and if so, how? How does active public forgetting intersect 
with unfolding conflict? Does public amnesia entrench or diffuse a confrontation? By 
comparing rectified sites of violence in East Africa’s confrontation with Al-Shabaab and 
sites of drowning in Mediterranean crossings resulting from the regional architecture of 
deterrence, the paper investigates how spaces of violence are and should be reclaimed 
and by whom. It posits, first, that while informal commemorative activities do exist, 
these cannot sublimate the public silence in/about spaces of violence. Second, the paper 
posits that absent memory and unmarked spaces of violence are endogenous to ongoing 
conflict dynamics, rather than separated from them, and create feedback loops to the 
unfolding conflict. 
By tackling the puzzle of (non)commemoration and active forgetting of violence 
in contexts of ongoing confrontation, the paper de-centers dominant TJ concerns over 
memory from the present to the absent, and from the space of the post- to the 
‘interstice’— the lingering in-between of conflict onset and resolution that defines many 
contemporary confrontations. Commemoration is usually ‘of’ conflict, not ‘within’ 
conflict. The hold of the post- imperative remains strong in TJ as evidenced in some of 
the most recent conceptual and empirical monographs in the field.2 That few societies 
                                                        
1 See Kenneth E. Foote, Shadowed Ground: America’s Landscapes of Violence and Tragedy (Austin, 
TX: University of Texas Press, 2003). 
2 In The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, Colleen Murphy sets out her analysis by 
stating that ‘the term transitional justice is generally taken to refer to formal attempts by 
postrepressive or postconflict societies to address past wrongdoing.’ See Colleen Murphy, The 
Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1. In 
Performances of Injustice on the recently concluded Kenyan TJRC process, Gabrielle Lynch 
similarly conceptualizes TJ as dealing with ‘unjust histories.’ Gabrielle Lynch, Performances of 
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implementing TJ can be classed as post-repressive or post-conflict is now well 
established. The boundaries of reckoning with mass violence in dominant approaches to 
TJ have increasingly been challenged on account of partial, stalled or reversed political 
and peace transitions, questioning the double-transition paradigm.3 Contexts that 
depart from normative TJ are far from unique and push us to consider the fates of TJ 
experiments in ‘illiberal peace-builders’4 under ‘repressive peace,’5 under violent 
transitions, and the implications partial transitions, even reversed transitions. In short, 
argue authors such as Dustin Sharp, we need to free ourselves from the grip of the 
‘paradigmatic transition.’6 
This paper builds on these emerging debates, applying questions of redress to 
contexts of continued tension, violence, and ongoing confrontation.7 The paper 
challenges the notion that redress must occur after decisive de-escalations ending 
seemingly concrete events such as ‘war’ and after salient markers of transformation 
such as peace processes. Similarly, it probes the dominant focus on injustice arising in 
contexts of large-scale, organized violence. Migrant deterrence and (counter-)terrorism 
are rarely studied under the TJ rubric8 and yet these low-intensity, protracted 
confrontations pose similar questions and challenges. These powerful confrontations 
                                                        
Injustice: The Politics of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya (Cambridge University Press, 
2018). 
3 See e.g. Dustin Sharp, ‘Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic 
Transition,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 9(1) (2015): 150-169. 
4 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, ‘Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 
49 (2) (2011): 287-314. 
5 Ingrid Samset, ‘Building a repressive peace: The case of post-genocide Rwanda,’ Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 5 (3)  (2011): 265-283. 
6 Sharp, supra n 3. 
7 For an exception, see Pilar Riano Alcala and Maria Victoria Uribe, ‘Constructing Memory Amidst 
War: The Historical Memory Group of Colombia,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 10 
(2016): 6-24.   
8 For exceptions, see works that highlight TJ blind spots in the broader areas of terrorism and 
displacement: Elena Sciandra, ‘Facing States of Fear: The Emerging Issues of Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism in Transitional Justice,’ Chapter 6 in S.N. Romaniuk et al (eds), The Palgrave 
Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy (Palgrave, 2017) and Lucy Hovil, ‘The Nexus between 




produce systematic violence with a staggering human cost where responses are 
typically implicated in furthering and entrenching the confrontation.  
The focus here on acute, low-intensity confrontations aims to push us to expand 
TJ temporalities (the ‘when’ of TJ) as much as its spatial limits (the ‘where’ of TJ). 
Ongoing confrontations crossing boundaries such as (counter)-terror campaigns and 
migrant deterrence reflect the problem of leaving TJ as a business of the ‘post’ (-conflict) 
or ‘within’ (a nation state) and ask of us to produce conceptual tools and theories more 
fully attuned to the challenges of our time. The paper advances concepts and builds 
theory around the linkage between memory and conflict, and the role of 
commemoration and witnessing in rectified space. It charts new areas of study in 
interstitial justice (i.e. justice of the in-between, the limbo), transit justice (i.e. redress 
for en-route violence), (mass) crimes of deterrence and memory of (counter)terrorism.  
The paper studies the conflict charge of public amnesia through the lens of the 
rectified site and concrete cases of rectification, spaces not systematically explored 
either as a unique phenomenon or in specific iterations. Since rectified sites remain 
publicly un-commemorated, they are unlike sites typically studied under the rubric of 
TJ. They remain outside the ‘global rush to commemorate atrocities,’9 perhaps most 
visible in Rwanda and South Africa, and as such pose different questions. These are not 
debates about the ‘postwars of the dead’10 as these confrontations are far from over. 
Equally, the debate is not about partial or politicized memory (e.g. Rwanda)11 or 
organized oblivion and politically expedient neglect (e.g. Sri Lanka, DRC, Burundi). 
Instead, the debate is about when and how these sites should be commemorated in the 
                                                        
9 Paul Williams, Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities (Oxford, Berg 
2007).  
10 Richard Werbner, ‘Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, Memory and 
Inscription in Zimbabwe,’ In Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of 
Power, Richard Werbner (ed) (London, Zed Books: 1998) 
11 Elisabeth King, ‘Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ Memory Studies 3(4) 
(2010): 330-343.  
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first place, and how absence of public memory is in itself productive of political and 
conflict dynamics.  
The paper purposefully chooses two different types of rectified site to think 
through the conceptual and empirical expansion in TJ.  What joins spaces as distant as 
the Westgate Mall and a mass drowning site off Lampedusa is the politics and impact of 
the unmarked and the unaccounted. But their differences are instructive too as the 
anatomies of memory absence diverge somewhat. The ongoing confrontation with salafi 
jihadi groups in Kenya and Somalia has generated multiple sites of ‘terrorist’ and 
‘counter-terrorist’ violence that have received no public recognition. In Kenya, the 
confrontation layers on histories of tension and exclusion, in Somalia on decades-long 
violence. Yet no formal mechanisms of redress and commemoration exist for the two 
confrontations. Spaces like the Westgate Mall or Garissa College slip back to daily use, 
becoming mundane and extraordinary at once. 
The violence of transit at Mediterranean sea crossings not only produces 
unmarked (and often unmarkable) sites but lacks a justice frame altogether. As will be 
shown, this is underpinned by a deeper absence of a missing vocabulary and epistemic 
space for TJ interventions. The lacunae of the violence of transit reach deeper, beyond 
politically produced amnesia or paradigmatic neglect, to the lack of vocabularies and 
epistemic recognition: How should we speak about mass migrant deaths in terms 
relevant to redress? And while both sets of sites challenge the temporalities of TJ, the 
violence of transit challenges its geographies as well. 
Despite this differentiation, an overarching argument emerges, and namely that 
while public amnesia tends to entrench ongoing confrontations, recognition in form of 
commemoration needs to be calibrated carefully in order to assure de-escalation rather 
than escalation of conflict, as selective remembrance can become counter-productive. In 
both cases, epistemic redress must precede/pave way for attempts at political redress 
and symbolic redress in sites of violence. The paper also urges us to pay close attention 
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and distinguish between different layers and types of amnesia and silence. For this, 
memory acts and recognition need to simultaneously come to the site and abandon it. 
They need to forge nodes of reflection that reach beyond the site and its singular 
violence to include forces of violence invisible or distant to the site.  
The paper draws on qualitative methods and on diverse sources, both primary 
and secondary, spanning observation, informal discussions, and material and symbolic 
archives in the form of physical sites, memorial designs and informal commemoration 
both online and offline. The original primary material for this paper has been gathered 
during a trip to Kenya in August 2018, when the author had the opportunity to visit the 
Westgate Mall on a number of occasions as well as informal memorial initiatives such as 
the Amani peace garden in the Karura forest and had the opportunity to chat with 
members of the Sakuma Twende Group who designed and financed the project. The 
author has also visited a number of other official and informal sites of memory of 
violence in Kenya including the site of the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombings in Nairobi, the UN 
memorial to the same event, to place the aforementioned sites in context. The Somalia 
case study incorporates primary data in the form of memorial design and official 
speeches, but does not draw on fieldwork. The Lampedusa case study draws on 
secondary material. The paper looks at actual memorial practices, but besides this 
considers a more unique archive: that of materiality of sites and its transformation, 
including the re-design and repurposing, reconstruction and re-opening, fortification or 
normalization on sites. All of these different forms of material inscription and practice 
can serve as vital text for deciphering the way in which memory, forgetting and conflict 
intersect. Overall, while primary data has been gathered and utilized, the paper is 
mainly a conceptual exploration, supported by and rooted in concrete spaces and 






The Rectified Site 
 
The paper borrows Kenneth Foote’s concept of ‘rectification’ from the memory 
literature, but apples it specifically to ongoing violence and TJ concerns. The paper uses 
the concept to refer to and analyze publically uncommemorated sites of political 
violence in ongoing crises. These sites are returned to their previous use without mark 
or ceremony and become part of everyday life such as the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, 
Kenya or the K-5 intersection in Mogadishu, Somalia. Taking public silence as a 
departing point, the paper diverges from dominant academic concerns with the politics 
of commemoration in the wake of violence where such public memory work is ongoing.  
TJ scholarship has certainly paid attention to the many meanings of silence. 
There is now burgeoning, critical literature on public memory in the wake of conflict, 
describing its partiality and erasures, as well as its politicization.12  But the sites under 
study here are distinct. These are not quite ‘disavowed memorials’13 or ‘conspicuously 
neglected sites’14 or public memorials doubling as ‘sites of forgetting,’15 or sites of 
‘underprivileged memory.’16 They also differ from more recent research on failed 
                                                        
12 see King, supra n. 6; Rachel Ibreck, ‘The Politics of Mourning,’ Memory Studies 3(4) (2010): 
330-343; Jens Meierhenrich, ‘Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation 
of Lieux de Memoire in Rwanda,’ in Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After 
Mass Violence, Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf (eds) (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 
2011): 283-296. 
13 Timothy Longman, Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda (Cambridge University Press: 
2017); 86. 
14 Ibid, 85. 
15 Ibid, 86; ‘a site where leaders have pointedly ignored past events and removed their traces in 
an effort to obliterate their memory’ 
16 supra n 8 at 285. 
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memorial projects,17 and unfinished memorials,18 ‘accidental memorials’19 or deposed 
monuments.20  
The sites under study are spaces of active public silence. While informal 
commemoration does take place offsite in many different forms from vigils to cyber-
memorials, church services and more, this does not ‘fill’ the public memory void onsite 
and offsite. The lacunae of memory are not without a political charge and constitutive 
power, and, as I argue, in fact constitute the confrontation and enable its progress. From 
the politics and violence of the already inscribed, these sites refocus our attention on the 
political charge of the un-inscribed.  
But public memory voids are not all the same and the two sets of sites chosen 
here show overlapping aspects but also differing challenges. Arguably, the void of 
migrant transit sites is more complex and layered than that of sites of violence within 
the state. Transit sites are not interstitial in a temporal sense only, as in lying in between 
beginnings and ends of conflict. The interstice here is also spatial (in between of states) 
and epistemic (outside prevailing vocabularies and concepts of redress). Transit deaths 
thus challenge not only temporality but the location of TJ and the types of violations that 
merit attention: How do we name, recognize and commemorate transnational crimes of 
transit? 
Perhaps most importantly, these are not only sites where conflict imprints in a 
manner of physical violence, but where, as a result, sites start participating in both 
meta-conflict—the conflict over the nature of the conflict— through verbal and spatial 
encoding such as fortification, reopening, silence phrased as triumphalism, and in 
                                                        
17 Sebina Sivac-Bryant, ‘The Omarska Memorial Project as an Example of How Transitional Justice 
Interventions Can Produce Hidden Harms,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 9(1) 
(2014): 170-180.  
18 E.g. Zoe Cormack, ‘The Spectacle of Death: Visibility and Concealment at an Unfinished 
Memorial in South Sudan,’ Journal of Eastern African Studies (2017): 115-132.  
19 Alex deWaal and Rachel Ibreck, ‘Alem Bakagn: The African Union’s Accidental Human Rights 
Memorial,’ African Affairs 112 (447) (2013): 191-215. 
20 as part of the decolonial movement such as Rhodes Must Fall 
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conflict itself, through memory suppression and politicized amnesia. The following 
section looks at the relationship between memory and conflict more closely. 
 
 
Memory, Amnesia and Conflict 
 
Rectified sites pose pointed questions to the available peace and conflict, TJ and memory 
literature. Specifically, they challenge the dominant TJ paradigm and the view of 
memory and commemoration as i) a form of reckoning with a gone-by past occurring 
‘after’ violent conflict, ii) as an inherently peace-inducing measure; and iii) as unfolding 
in a politically liberalizing space. To achieve this, the paper investigates the 
(non)reckoning with a past in a still polarized and violent social context, during a time of 
securitization and democratic closure on its account, and puts the peace-building 
assumption to scrutiny, asking: Does public dis-engagement with memory work to 
escalate or de-escalate the ongoing conflict, and what are the pathways?  
The common construal of commemoration as an a posteriori act and one that 
has peace enhancing potential has been increasingly questioned, with scholars speaking 
of commemoration in conflict21 and commemoration as conflict,22 where 
commemorative events in societies such as Northern Ireland or Palestine can in fact 
serve to assert ‘limits to solidarity’23 and entrench the confrontation. The present paper 
builds on this emerging literature in two ways. If work on the commemoration-conflict 
nexus is emerging, work on the linkage between amnesia and conflict is largely absent. 
Much more systematic research is also needed to answer questions of ‘under what 
                                                        
21  Brendan Browne, ‘Commemoration in Conflict,’ Journal of Comparative Research in 
Anthropology and Sociology 4(2) (2013): 143-164. 
22 Sara McDowell and Maire Braniff (Eds), Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and 
Identity in Peace Processes (Palgrave, 2014); J.E. Tunbridge and G.J. Ashworth, Dissonant Heritage: 
The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict (Wiley, 1996). 
23 Browne, supra n 17 at 144. 
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conditions and in which ways are commemorative acts and amnesia transformative of 
conflict?’ 
Though the link between memory and conflict has been explored both broadly24 
and in specific contexts, available literature tends to focus on deep historical narratives 
and myths, the representations, grievances and emblematic events anchoring those 
narratives, and the way these have been mobilized in later episodes of conflict. The 
Hamitic Myth in Rwanda or the Kosovo Pole narrative in former Yugoslavia have been 
some of the most cited examples of historical narratives fuelling and justifying violent 
conflict. Volkan’s influential concept of ‘chosen traumas’25 is central to this line of 
inquiry, pointing to selective traumatic events carried over time in collective memory 
and transferring grievance over time via retelling and memory ritual.  
Interstitial sites, however, do not fit the dominant concern over deep history and 
its recycling into conflict in contexts as diverse as Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. 
Instead, here we deal with the ‘instant past,’ the impact of violent events proper to the 
ongoing conflict. And we do not simply look at the uses of memory of violence, but the 
uses of amnesia and its own impacts on social and conflict dynamics. The focus on 
politicized historical narratives and chosen traumas eschews the issue of public amnesia 
since it, after all, looks at what is being carried in memory. Volkan’s conception is also 
distinctly nation-state bound and does not easily apply to the violence of transit. Which 
nation or collectivity will claim mass drownings as a historical scar carried over time to 
perpetuate cycles of conflict? Lastly, the cast of analysis is in the direction of memory as 
a factor contributing to conflict, rather than a more open-ended exploration allowing for 
different causal directionalities. 
                                                        
24 Barbara Tint, ‘History, Memory and Intractable Conflict,’ Conflict Resolution Quarterly 27(3) 
(2010). 
25 Vamik D. Volkan, ‘Transgenerational Transmission and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-
Group Identity,’ Group Analysis 34(1) (2001). 
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Another line of inquiry links memory’s absence to peace. Here, forgetting is 
portrayed as a way to prevent destabilization, disruption of fragile local equilibriums of 
coexistence or re-traumatisation. The findings on preferences for amnesia draw from 
empirical works in divided, post-war local contexts such as Rwanda and Burundi. 26 
Local narratives on forgetting are far from straightforward and unproblematic, 
however, as they often result from an uneasy combination of pragmatism, imperatives 
of local coexistence in deeply divided societies, but also carefulness, dejection, and 
adoption of silence as a safety measure in contexts where memory is politicized. At the 
national level, governments can also re-narrate silence as triumphalism, or as a way to 
vanquish the past and build unity. Besides these preferences and incentives, amnesia’s 
links to conflict are yet to be systematically ascertained, especially in ongoing 
confrontations. But even if amnesia is found to contribute to conflict, this does not mean 
that public memory work will automatically have the opposite effect. The two must be 
considered separately. 
Wendy Lambourne offers us a useful tool to think through rectification and the 
memory-conflict puzzle in ongoing confrontations. She argues that the term ‘transitional 
justice’ should give way to a more productive term of ‘transformative justice.’27 The 
latter eschews constricting assumptions about transition and becomes applicable to a 
broader set of contexts, including those of ongoing tension and confrontation. In this 
study, I apply the transformative lens particularly to commemoration and its absence. I 
investigate ‘transformative amnesia’ in addition to ‘transformative memory,’ asking 
                                                        
26 Peter Uvin and Ann Nee, ‘Silence and Dialogue: Burundian’s Alternatives to Transitional 
Justice’ in Rosalind Shaw et al (eds), Localising Transitional Justice (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010); Bert Ingelaere, ‘Living Together Again. The Expectations of Transitional Justice in 
Burundi- A View From Below’, IOB Working Paper (2009); Marita Eastmond and Johanna M. 
Selimovic, ‘Silence as a Possibility in Post-War Everyday Life,’ International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 6(3) (2012). 
27 Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence’, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (1) (2009): 28–48. 
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whether and how different forms of silence symbolized by and inscribed into rectified 
sites of violence interact with and influence the unfolding confrontation.  
 
MEMORY IN CRISIS I  
TRIUMPHALISM & OBLIVION: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC AMNESIA IN EAST 
AFRICA’S ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
 
The confrontation with the militant salafi jihadi group Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia 
has over the past decade produced its own landscape of sites of violence, from hotels to 
schools, shopping malls to intersections. What joins them is a public silence on the past. 
Though informal and private forms of memory exist, these sites are not publically 
inscribed, memorialized or investigated. The confrontation in question does not simply 
encompass the spectacle of Al-Shabaab’s attacks but equally the violence of 
disappearance and detention in counter-terror measures. What explains the amnesia 
and does it impact the ongoing conflict?  
This section considers three concrete sites of Al-Shabaab violence as a way to 
work through this quandary–the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, the Garissa University 
College in Garissa, Kenya and the K-5 intersection in Mogadishu, Somalia. All three share 
the status of dark icons: these are sites of the most spectacular attacks that are at once 
well-known markers and yet restored to mundane use in the wake of violence. In all 
three cases, I outline the nature of the public amnesia, what repurposing and revising of 
these sites betrays about the ways in which amnesia is channeled into particular action, 
and I place them within broader contexts and layers of violence and silence that reach 
much beyond the site.  
Importantly, the public silence does not mean there is no memory work ongoing. 
Diverse forms of informal and private commemoration take place, at home, in local 
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churches and shrines,28 and in public spaces online and offline. Vigils, talks and movies 
have been organized by private citizens to remember the Westgate attacks. A civic 
organization Sukuma Twende Group has raised money from donations and put up the 
Amani memorial garden and monument in tranquil expanse of the Karura forest at the 
outskirts of Nairobi.29 In Garissa, a group of activists have organized a sleep-in in the 
dormitories where the attack took place to symbolically reclaim the space. A group of 
private citizens here too raised funds and put up a monument listing names of victims in 
a memorial garden on the premises of the school. In Mogadishu, a young Somali 
architect has produced concrete designs of a memorial for the K-5 bombings, actively 
promotes the idea of a memorial online, and has managed to gain the attention of the 
local Benadiri authorities.  
 By focusing on the public sphere, the paper is not trying to discount these varied 
informal memorial forms and activity. But it takes seriously the silence at the national 
level and the controversy that it has caused as indicative of not only the political 
underpinnings of state-level amnesia but also its real effects on the unfolding 
confrontation. The lack of public inscriptions on Al-Shabaab attacks in Westgate 
contrasts starkly with the dedicated memorial and the commemorative events of the 
2002 Al Qaeda bombings of the American Embassy in Nairobi. Commissions of inquiry 
into the Westgate and Mpeketoni attacks were promised by the Kenyan government but 
never delivered. The lack of public memory work is thus not just an omission, but an 
active form of silence.  
The Westgate shopping mall, an upscale retail centre in the Westlands area of 
Nairobi, became a dark icon on the cityscape when the then-largest Al-Shabaab attack 
was staged here on 21 September 2013. The attack claimed 71 lives and it took days for 
                                                        
28 For example, there was a prayer group at the nearby Jain Oshwal Centre one week after the 
attack.  
29 Interview with a Sukuma Twende Group member, Nairobi, August 18, 2018. Visit to Amani 
garden, Nairobi, August 13, 2018. 
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the security forces to neutralize the attackers. The slow security response gave rise 
critique, questions, and rumor. The exact details of the attack remain unclear five years 
later as no official inquest took place. The mall – a site of siege, killings and state 
intervention— was closed by the government, only to be re-opened two years later in 
the summer of 2015. No official memory work, commemoration or monument would 
mark the attack, before or after the re-opening. People wishing to commemorate were 
left to their own devices, online and offline, but mainly off-site. The memory controversy 
that ensued was captured in powerful headlines and cartoons: ‘On the anniversary of 
the Westgate attack, Kenya is at risk of forgetting it ever happened,’30 or ‘Forgetting 
Westgate: how Kenya erases terrorism.’31  
Indeed, the Westgate Mall today bears no mark of its violent past. The glitzy 
interiors are filled with luxury brands, soft background music and the murmur of falling 
water. But the site of the mall does offer ways of reading the erasure and forgetting 
captured in the headlines above as a presence that is productive, both politically and vis-
à-vis the unfolding confrontation. The re-opening, restructuring and re-inhabiting of the 
mall show how public amnesia is produced and becomes productive. Two memory 
labors in particular deserve our attention– the reopening that phrased and 
monumented amnesia as thriumphalism, and the physical reconstruction that answered 
violence with fortification. 
The re-opening of the Westgate Mall might have been accompanied by absence 
of public commemoration and demarcation of the 2013 attack, but a transcript on 
memory was nonetheless produced. The opening was marked by speeches by Nairobi’s 
then-governor Evans Kidero and Inspector General of Police, Joseph Boinnet, who 
                                                        
30 Lily Kuo, ‘On the anniversary of the Westgate attack, Kenya is at risk of forgetting it ever 
happened,’ Quartz Africa, September 21, 2016, available online at: 
https://qz.com/africa/787125/on-the-anniversary-of-the-westgate-attack-kenya-is-at-risk-of-
forgetting-it-ever-happened/ 





proclaimed Westgate as a ‘new symbol of courage and resilience, strength and 
fortitude.’32 Amnesia itself was to be a monument. The absence of an index and 
investigation was to be overtly dictated by triumphalism. 
The political expediency of the amnesia was, nonetheless, clear to see and 
brought to the fore a tension between the official narrative of triumphalist silence and a 
counter-narrative of amnesia as suppression. The Westgate Mall is not only a memory of 
profound insecurity meted out by four members of Al-Shabaab, of people killed, preyed 
upon and hiding, it is also a testament to the instability to secure, a narrative on the 
state. The two cannot be easily disentangled. First, there is the issue of the prolonged 
attempt to free hostages and to neutralize the attackers. The siege took four days but 
most victims lost their lives in the first hours. Further to this, videos emerged showing 
that ‘soldiers looted shops and blasted open safes’33 during the operation. In contrast, 
the nearby Oshwal Community Centre and the Jain community self-organized to help in 
rescue and response efforts. A non-state actor became the hero of the story, with further 
narratives emerging around the conspicuous absence of the state in crisis management 
efforts. 
The Westagate site thus doubles not only as a space of attack but a space of 
government response and state ‘shame.’ Transcript on the attack is the transcript on the 
state. The siege ended with an explosion of the back part of the mall that buried the 
attackers under rubble. What was at stake in investigating the attack would not be 
discussed, but it would be nonetheless powerfully asserted and inscribed right into the 
mall’s structure.  
The ‘fortitude’ that Kidero and Boinnet mentioned in their re-opening speeches 
is indeed what remained after the attack. Narrative was replaced with force, 
                                                        
32 ‘Kenya’s Westgate Mall Re-opens,’ Business Daily, July 28, 2015, available online at: 
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vulnerability and insecurity at the heart of the memory were overlayed with an excess 
of security measures. The Westgate Mall was visibly fortified, with an Israeli firm IRG 
now in charge of security. The X-ray machines at the entrance have been accompanied 
by sniffer dogs, explosives detectors, bullet-proof guard towers and boosting of security 
personnel. There are multiple security guards at the entrance, at the back of the mall by 
the ramp and inside the mall as well. A ‘no stopping at any time’ sign has been put up 
close to the place where the armed men stopped their vehicle. The ramp entrance at the 
back through which two of the attackers accessed the roof remains closed off. 
Fortification is the most salient change and fits with the narrative of triumph. 
Fortification of Westgate symbolically ‘rectified’ the past and thus put it to rest. It 
created amnesia and memory as a non-issue. By discursively framing this incident as a 
security issue, remembrance became not only ‘of’ vulnerability, but vulnerability itself, 
in need of diffusion. The re-opening of a fortified mall symbolically rewound the clock 
and made a transcript on vulnerability and insecurity seemingly pasé.  
Other spaces of Al-Shabab attack in Kenya show similar memory dynamics. The 
Garissa University College located in the northern town of the same name is a place of 
another major attack in April 2015 that claimed 148 student lives. The university was 
closed for nine months before being ‘quietly’ re-opened34 by the government without 
any mark or major ceremony, though it was renovated, repainted, and importantly, 
fortified. The gate to the university premises that used to be open in the past has been 
closed and is manned by armed police. There is a new administrative police post headed 
by a chief inspector, a perimeter wall fitted with razor wire and a 24-hour CCTV. Three 
watchtowers are manned by armed security men. No one is allowed in without either an 
ID or permit issued by local authorities. Just as in the case of Westgate, a defensive 
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security response in the form of fortification dominates over measures focused on 
transformation of core conflict drivers.  
Despite the security measures, ‘students have been apprehensive of the 
institution and have been seeking transfers.’35 In a historically marginalized region of 
Kenya, with difficult memories of the state intervention and tense state-society 
relations,36 the attack on and the effective weakening of the first and only university in 
the region has further underlined both the success of the attacks and the inability of the 
government to extricate itself from a longer past of securitization of Kenya’s northern 
frontier areas and the violence it itself visited upon them. The public amnesia on Al-
Shabaab violence in Garissa, along with the politicized and openly contested closure, re-
opening and fortification thus become paradoxically a reminder of much deeper 
memories and grievances, including those related to memory suppression of past 
violence. 
In the context of public amnesia, it has again fallen on families of victims and 
local community members and activists such as the Northern Advocacy Organization to 
hold vigils, sleep-ins and raise money for a memorial garden. In contrast to the Westgate 
Mall, the Garissa University Memorial Garden was opened on the premises of the school, 
with a memorial plaque listing the victims’ names. From all these activities, ‘the state 
was noticeably absent.’37 No regular commemorative events would take place as, 
according to the Vice Chancellor ‘anniversaries bring back bad memories.’38 
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Importantly, the fortification of the mall or later the university are aspects of a 
much broader push to securitization of public space and confrontation in the wake of 
the attacks. Accent on prevention, surveillance and local policing (under a new nuymba 
kumi system) was married to securitization of whole groups of people at the intersection 
of Muslim, Somali and refugee identity categories. The 2014 Usalama Watch campaign 
has hit urban areas like the Somali-dominated Eastleigh district and has led to detention 
of thousands in Nairobi’s Kasarani stadium. Insecurity was meted out in the name of 
security. An extraordinary set of attacks has thus produced a more systematic and 
mundane sort of insecurity, the violence of round-ups, death threats, targeted killings 
and disappearances at the hands of the security forces. Whereas places like Westgate 
and Garissa at least stimulate debate on public amnesia, these ‘far more encompassing’39 
spaces face a deeper memory void yet.  
Public amnesia in Kenya is a productive type of silence. Even as Garissa or 
Westgate produce no public memorials or commemorations, their re-openings and 
rectifications do implicitly reify a text of the conflict as reducible to an attacker and 
resolvable through confrontation. The public forgetting is an active one— the void is 
meant to be a reminder of resilience and resolve, even as by many it is understood as 
expedient neglect branded as triumphalism. Importantly, active amnesia further justifies 
securitisation and confrontation as a form of resolution, even as these have proven 
counter-productive.40 The excessive security on rectified sites obscures the insecurities 
that remain unaddressed through these measures and those meted out in response.  
In neighboring Somalia, publically un-commemorated sites of Al Shabaab attacks 
abound but the politics of amnesia differs from that of Kenya in important ways. Somalia 
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is the birthplace of Al-Shabaab and though the group is today the most important armed 
challenger to the still fragile central state, it emerged among and sits atop layers and 
decades of violence perpetrated by multiple actors. While informal commemoration of 
the civil war has taken many forms over the years, using poetic and fictional forms, as 
well as online community debates and notes,41 the violence of the civil war has not been 
subject to systematic public redress or commemoration. The memory landscape 
remains extremely fragmented and politicized.42 The ‘mountains of memory’43 to be 
scaled and the contestations around them are indeed profound. 
It is in this context of a deadlock on memory that we must critically examine a 
recent attempt at introducing a public memorial in a thus far uncommemorated but 
iconic space of an Al-Shabaab attack. Sites of ‘terrorist’ violence in Somalia are multiple 
and include strategic urban spaces of markets such as Wadajir, intersections such as K-5 
and hotels such as Nasa-Hablod. The largest and most impactful Al-Shabaab attack 
happened on October 14, 2017 at the K-5 intersection or ‘Zoobe Junction’ in Mogadishu, 
with a bustling market that has grown up around the junction. The K-5 attack did not 
only become the biggest casualty attack since 9/11, claiming 587 lives, but is also fairly 
recent, underlining the ongoing nature of the confrontation.  
The K-5 attack has inspired a young, Italian-born Somali architect Omar Degan 
to design a public memorial for the space of the attack, a space which for now remains 
rectified, having returned to previous use without mark or ceremony. On November 3, 
2017, Omar Degan has tweeted: ‘I’m working on the project for the memorial to 
commemorate victims of the terrorist attack of 14 Oct. I will need your opinions and 
critique.’ Some time later, Degan has posted detailed and meticulously thought-through 
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designs of a sleek, abstract structure of tall stone slabs and a pathway in between, with 
Somalis depicted sitting in reflection and walking through the structure. Omar Degan’s 
plan has attracted attention of the local Benadir Regional Administration officials, which 
are reviewing the proposal.’44  
If the design and attempts of Degan are commendable, difficult questions 
nonetheless arise. What does it mean that a first memorial of its kind comes to 
commemorate the recent, the spectacular, and the ‘one-among-many’? In Somalia, ‘there 
is nothing that pays homage to the war’s victims,’45 a war where Al-Shabaab has been 
merely one actor, and one among the most recent. ‘Not to trivialize our losses,’ a Somali 
observer notes, ‘but what about the tens of thousands the Siyaad government massacred 
in the North? Just .. gonna ignore that? Forget a memorial, those victims can't even get 
an acknowledgement from the State.’46 Many other ‘what abouts’ could be added. Two 
important and related issues nonetheless arise, that of partiality and exceptionality of 
one type of violence over another, and the process of memorial making itself.  
 First, the focus on the violence at K-5 excises ‘terrorism’ of Al-Shabaab from 
other sorts of violence that have also marked the urban space of Mogadishu, and of 
course much beyond. It risks to consolidate a dominant and decontextualised narrative 
that obscures local roots of Al-Shabaab and the reading of the group as continuation of 
insurgency on the margins of the state. It excises the state’s own precarious legitimacy, 
its own role in fomenting the group’s rise, its violent response. Importantly, the 
government risks to trade memorialisation of a globally-recognized ‘enemy’ (the salafi 
jihadi terrorist) to build its international standing and symbolic capital, while obscuring 
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the deep divides that still preclude meaningful public memory-making and redress for 
past of violence on the ground. Partial memory making, externally-geared legitimation 
through commemoration, and nation-building revolving around a ‘terrorist’ other risk to 
further public amnesia on an exceedingly difficult past. 
Second, the process of memorial making at play here itself requires scrutiny. 
What we witness is not quite a top-down but neither a bottom-up process. Degan’s is an 
individual attempt promoted widely on social media, and picked up by the local 
authorities; coming from the social networks to the local political arena. The process 
needs to be carefully calibrated to assure that it does not become politicized (as per 
above) and that it does not excise, symbolically downplay or inflate other types of 
violence, and the involvement of those who have suffered it.  
In sum, the case of Kenya shows how rectified sites already ‘act,’ socially and 
politically, how active amnesia has the potential to entrench a confrontation. Both Kenya 
and Somalia equally show us that memory work can be polarizing if it focuses on one 
aspect of violence, dissecting it from a complex layering of others: in Kenya, if it focuses 
on the spectacle of mass sites, and evades the disappearances and the more mundane 
violence of the state, in Somalia, if the focus lies on spectacles of ‘terrorist’ violence, 
neglecting and symbolically erasing or disadvantaging other layers of non-state violence 
since the collapse of the state in 1990. This in turn ties to the discursively established 
exceptionality of violence labeled as terror and the tendency to portray it as extra-state 
and wielded against the state and citizens, rather than as co-produced with the 
involvement of the state.  
This means that epistemic rectifications must accompany symbolic ones—the 
recognition and proper naming of the confrontation, its core drivers and constituent 
forces. This means de-exceptionalizing ‘terrorist’ violence, seeing it through the lens of a 
longer-term struggle and grievances, and not excising the state from its own complicity 
in re-producing the crisis. It calls us to both pay careful attentions to sites, to read sites 
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closely, but also to abandon the singularity of the site and read for silences and 
implications that reach beyond it. 
 
MEMORY IN CRISIS II 
CONCEPTUAL INVISIBILITIES: MASS DROWNINGS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND 
THE VIOLENCE OF TRANSIT 
 
The violence of migrant transit across the Mediterranean opens another window on 
memory ‘in crisis’ and the interaction of amnesia (here of mass drownings) with the 
dynamics of ongoing confrontation (in the form of a system of control and deterrence). 
‘The past two decades have seen a dramatic rise in the number of such deaths,’47  
painting a picture of continued confrontation with a staggering cost. According to the 
IOM, between 2000-2014, an estimated 22,400 migrants perished at EU borders. In the 
first half of 2018 alone, 50,872 migrants and refugees arrived by sea to Europe and 
about 1443 died or were reported missing (IOM). Often, hundreds of migrants die in 
separate boat disasters that far from accidents are in fact a systematic and systemic cost 
of unsafe passage, an issue directly compounded by securitization of migration, 
criminalization of passage and the attendant deterrent and control measures, the 
‘illegality industry’48 and the cultivation of indifference in the name of security.49  
But the public amnesia in this case is arguably underpinned by deeper epistemic 
lacunae yet for we miss proper language that would render the violence and sites as 
objects of redress. Just as the refugee is the figure ‘between sovereigns,’ suspended 
outside the nation-state system, so is the grievability and the memory of their perishing 
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lives. The memory is not claimed by origin states, transit countries, countries of 
destination, or indeed regional government and the international community. Grief, 
mourning, and memory are still nation-state bound.50 But importantly, this does not 
only produce ‘affective disconnections’51 in Northern publics that can be counteracted 
by ‘a caring common,’52 it is the product of and further produces an epistemic and 
institutional lacunae.  
There is no official architecture of redress because there is no concept of a 
violation committed. There is no concept of ‘crimes of deterrence’ or non-entrée regime 
crimes, a situation directly compounded by the condition of ‘maritime legal black holes’ 
and de jure rightlessness on sea.53 Hence in contrast to the politics of amnesia in the 
‘war on terror’ explored above, the issue here is not about selectivity and suppression, 
and it is not about indexing that which, on the sea, is unmarkable. Here we are not only 
faced with a reluctance to name, but rather a missing vocabulary and ontology of 
redress, which then undermines proper recognition and acknowledgment. The problem 
here is both more straightforward and more profound: It concerns the violence of 
conceptual invisibility. 
The nature of the physical site also differs from our previous examples. The sites 
of Westgate and Garissa hold their memory, even if unexposed and contain a play of 
symbols and paradoxes that offer themselves to a critical alternative reading. Such 
archive on the seas is not available. Here we must begin ‘before’ and always already 
‘elsewhere’— if spatial reading is unavailable, we must nonetheless work with 
conceptual constructs, frames and vocabularies of the crime. We must erect an ontology 
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that will (re)create the space of monumentation and allow for creative if displaced 
forms of public memory. 
‘Intimate remembering [of migrant deaths] in the diaspora,’ writes Horsti54 ‘is 
shaped by several types of absences’ as there are no bodies (many die without their 
bodies being recovered, those who are recovered are mostly buried anonymously55), no 
knowledge of burial sites, and family members live dispersed across the world. Despite 
these absences, informal ways of commemorating death on sea do exist and are 
organized both online and offline by diaspora relatives, artists and civil society activists. 
In lieu of official memory processes, cyber-memorials and print memorials have been 
erected and other forms of ‘mediated commemoration’56 exist. Activities occur in 
physical space too. For example, the Eritrean survivors of the Lampedusa disaster have 
planted 366 plants in a memorial garden Giardino della Memoria on the island. More 
broadly, Eritrean diaspora has organized prayer vigils and commemorations that 
doubled as protests against the regime at home.57 These are all forms of ‘mnemonic 
resistance,’58 a way to ‘counter hegemonic silence,’59 to overcome the absences and the 
frames that undermine visibility, grievability and redress of transit deaths. None of 
these however come to directly address and challenge the epistemic lacunae and the 
systematic nature of the violence. 
A few nascent attempts by regional and national governments to commemorate 
deaths at sea can also be noted, but these are few and far between and peace-meal, 
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focused on concrete disasters rather than a systematic issue requiring systemic redress. 
In 2015, the ‘La Speranza Naufrata’ (i.e. ‘drowned hope’) memorial was inaugurated by 
local authorities in a cemetery in Catania, Sicily.  Nonetheless, the migrants buried in the 
site are anonymous, and the site is thus in more than one sense difficult to access for 
those who would like to mourn them. In the aftermath of the October 3, 2013 
Lampedusa disaster that claimed more than 360 migrant lives, the Italian government 
went further. It not only organized funerals and anniversary events but also declared 
3rd October, 2016 as the official day of commemoration of ‘victims of immigration.’60  
Rather than helping close up the conceptual lacuna, however, the representation 
of mass drowning victims as ‘victims of immigration’ is problematic. So has been the 
commemorative practice more broadly, showing us that, paradoxically, official memory 
work can consolidate forms of amnesia and preclude redress. To begin with, the 
language chosen absolves Italy of any implication and puts the death toll squarely on the 
abstract  ‘process’ of immigration, and indirectly those who chose to undergo it. The 
representation is far from radical, quite the opposite. It does not urge any structural 
change in the country’s approach, in the confrontation more broadly or in 
understanding and debating the death toll. The recent turning away of migrant boats 
from Italy’s waters suggests as much. The commemorative practices surrounding the 
Lampedusa disaster have also themselves subverted their very stated intentions. If they 
created meaning, that it was not one for the victims. The relatives of drowned Eritreans 
could not travel to reach the memorial space, and instead officials of Eritrea in Italy 
were invited, representatives of the very regime that these refugees were fleeing. If 
these memory labors created value, it was symbolic capital for Italy, whilst the 
languages chosen and subversions of meaning enacted helped to consolidate amnesia 
rather than create recognition leading to systematic redress. More broadly, these cases 
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show us clearly that concrete material monumentation and inscriptions of memory offer 
no guarantee that broader debates and reflections will be had, that these deaths are 
recognized, named, addressed, and ultimately, prevented. Memorials as 
‘compensation’61 are not memorials as redress, and in fact their erection can form a 
political attempt at ‘closure’ rather than an opening to further action.62 Finally, we must 
understand that the Italian response, however fraught, remains also unique. ‘Since then, 
the lives lost in the Mediterranean have steadily grown and no further acts if national 
commemoration of these victims have taken place in Europe.’63 
There are, however, some ongoing initiatives that can serve as an effective entry 
point to the sort of epistemic recognition and redress that is needed in the case of mass 
drownings. They comprise the simple but foundational acts of watching, monitoring, 
identifying, counting and listing. The Watch the Med group monitors migrant deaths, 
Mediterranean Hope has worked on identification, while Deaths at the Border database 
offers state-of-the-art counting based on official registry archives.64 One initiative 
though merits special emphasis. In 2017, the newspaper Tagesspiel published ‘Die Liste’ 
(The List) of 33,000 names of migrants drowned in the Mediterranean. ‘The list’ was 
later printed in an updated form in the June 20, 2018 Guardian supplement to mark the 
2018 World Refugee Day, with 34,361 names included. The importance of ‘the list’ is 
multifaceted. While it is not comprehensive, it does constitute an effective, powerful way 
to represent the cost of European deterrence, and the human insecurity produced at the 
heels of regional security policies.  
Whilst Die Liste does not do explicit political work, it does serve as an important 
opening to precisely that. The list is a print memorial of sorts, both a statement and an 
                                                        
61 Squire, supra n 53 at 513. 
62 See e.g. Edward Simpson and Stuart Corbridge, ‘The Geography of Things that may Become 
Memories,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96,3 (2006):566-585. 
63 Rodriquez, supra n 57 at 355. 




event, with reprints doubling as important memorial events in themselves. It is a 
political statement and an archive, documentary evidence and a form of recognition. 
Listing names is a way to concretize and humanize the suffering in ways in which 
casually deployed statistics and peace-meal numbers aren’t.  It is circulated in ways in 
which databases are not, it is available and pressing for attention in ways in which 
sporadic memorials and events are not. The list thus demands attention, humanizes 
suffering and lays bare the size and systematic loss of life. 
Perhaps most importantly, the list and the sheer scale of loss of life that it 
documents are an unmistakable proof of a systematic phenomenon that forces us to ask 
difficult questions typically reserved for transitional justice. There is no regime or war-
to-peace transition present here. Rather, what we face is an ongoing confrontation 
between those willing to move to improve their life chances and a non-entrée regime set 
up to curtail that project, what Mark Duffield powerfully named as ‘a global civil 
war…not between armies but at the level of existence itself.’ 65  The massive and 
systematic loss of life poses pressing queries: How should we talk about violence of 
displacement? And in which ways does the way we already talk or not about the deaths 
on the Mediterranean impact the confrontation? How do we name and address violence 
visited systematically upon moving people, people spatially, temporally and 
conceptually at the interstice? Some reporters and activists have called the 
Mediterranean a ‘mass grave.’ If we take this term as more than a rhetorical 
embellishment, and recognize that mass drownings in the Mediterranean have a scale of 
a crime against humanity, who are the perpetrators? How do we offer redress for 
indirect crimes of deterrence? And who and how should act? 
Epistemic redress means we need to begin with ontology, vocabularies and ways 
of naming and reframing the violence of transit. This is necessary for any public 
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recognition that actually leads to meaningful redress. The interpretation of mass 
drownings as a systematic form of violence co-produced with direct involvement of the 
European countries diverges from and undermines the dominant representation of 
transit death. In the dominant narrative, migrants are portrayed as helpless victims 
rather than agents,66 tragedy is attributed to ‘criminal’ smugglers, and responsibility for 
resolution is placed on the shoulders of states in Northern Africa and the Sahel. 
European states are excised from this frame. Yet if one fails to name all aspects of, sides 
to and nature of the confrontation, then it cannot be properly addressed and counter-
acted. More than this, amnesia on transit deaths as a systematic phenomenon contribute 
to perpetuate the structures that produce it. 
The case of one of the largest recent drownings off the coast of Egypt on April 9, 
2016 where 500 people lost their lives demonstrates these framing dynamics well.67 
Initially, there was no official inquiry for the first seven months after the drowning. The 
investigations that followed were powerfully skewed in the blame they apportioned. 
The traffickers were said to perpetrate ‘mass murder’68 and North African states were 
urged to co-operate to bring down transit rings. The UNHCR divested itself of 
responsibility altogether, clarifying ‘it is not a law enforcement agency and investigating 
sea disaster or transnational organized crime is beyond our means, mandate and 
expertise.’69 Through statements such as this, the refugee agency does not only re-assert 
the very real limits of its mandate, it also reproduces the standard frame of crime and 
blame put on networks of smugglers. If international bodies are not mandated, national 
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and regional power plays skew the lens powerfully. The ‘dealing with’ the atrocity is to 
squarely blame traffickers and to push countries in the Global South from Egypt to Lybia 
to increase policing and prosecution of those who enable passage. There is no space in 
this discourse for recognition and redress of transit deaths as a systemic form of 
violence.  
Epistemic redress must thus start with establishing mass drownings as ‘sites of 
violence’ in the first place, rather than unfortunate, episodic accidents attributable 
solely to illicit transit entrepreneurs. As of now, such nomenclature does not feature in 
the vocabularies and conceptual toolkit of policy. Transitional justice lacks a language of 
redress for the violence of transit. We need to place these deaths squarely into the 
framework of a systematic confrontation and recent academic literature has been 
experimenting with such shift in focus, speaking of ‘violence of contemporary bordering 
practices,’70 or ‘biophysical violence’ of abandonment71 symbolized by the infamous 
2011 left-to-die boat case. Just as the death of shoppers or school children or Muslim 
citizens is placed within the context of a ‘confrontation with terror,’ so mass drownings 
must be placed into such context as migrants confront a powerful regime of deterrence. 
Both of these are profound insecurities with structural underpinnings. In both cases, 
amnesia enables securitization, fortification, and criminalization by silencing the 
confrontation’s costs, displacing blame and obscuring the nature of the confrontation. 
Through this, amnesia helps to fuel the confrontation rather than helping to resolve it.   
 
CONCLUSIONS: ON EPISTEMIC REDRESS  
 
Rectified sites invite us to pay close attention to the anatomy, politics and conflict 
impact of absence, the labor of amnesia. This paper looked at two sets of un-
                                                        




commemorated or rectified sites in ongoing confrontations in an attempt to start 
understanding the links between amnesia and conflict. The paper finds that in both 
cases studied here, public amnesia does interact with conflict. It does not do this in a 
sequential way whereby amnesia leads to escalation, rather it does this in an embedded 
way whereby amnesia is part and parcel of enabling and entrenching the confrontation. 
In the case of the ‘war on terror,’ amnesia rephrased as triumphalism opens doors to a 
heavy-handed response and excises state complicity in producing and reproducing 
insecurity. In the case of migrant boat disasters, amnesia reaches deeper, as migrants 
fall out of established paradigms of memorial redress. Amnesia here is also about 
excision, as migrant deaths are parceled, rather than named and seen as a systematic 
phenomenon. Mass deaths at sea become ‘accidents’ rather than sites of violence in a 
confrontation whose parameters are given by powerful structures and where 
destination countries play a key part. The drowned are displaced after their death 
epistemologically, moved to an abstract plane as ‘victims of immigration.’ The violence 
leads to further criminalization of transit entrepreneurs and further securitization and 
policing of transit routes, even if now moved further south. Amnesia in both cases 
entrenches the confrontation through defensive security acts that excise and exclude 
memory, forego proper naming, and thus preclude meaningful redress. 
By looking at rectified sites of violence, the paper pushes the paradigmatic binds 
of TJ and challenges our notions of when its questions and concerns apply. It is merely a 
first step inviting conceptual mapping. It calls for further exploration of concepts 
including interstitial justice, transit justice, (mass) crimes of deterrence, and memory of 
(counter)terrorism. Epistemic exploration of this kind represents a form of redress 
comprising reframing and naming, and ontological redress by properly asserting order 
and naming its constituent parts. The motor towards action on this front should be our 
knowledge, demonstrated here on two distinct examples, that amnesia is not a mere 
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unfortunate outfall of politicized, ongoing conflicts, but helps constitute and perpetuate 
them.  Amnesia is a form of memory labor that has constitutive power. 
The interstitial sites that bear the marks of these confrontations are not simply 
reflections and symbols to be read and excavated off their physical traces or absences. 
Neither are they ‘separate’ terrain of meta-conflict, parallel to conflict itself. Forms of 
remembrance and amnesia are part and parcel of conflict dynamics, but if this means 
that they can be co-opted and can deepen polarization, so they offer us a way to 
transform conflict in a different direction through acts of analytic attention, 
visibilization and defiance, through purposeful search for new languages of redress and 
recognition. 
 
